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ABSTRACT
Purpose: Property taxation is a crucial source of finance for local government around the 
world – based on a presumptive tax base underpinned by estimates of property value, 
Inaccurate real estate valuations used for such ad valorem or value-based property tax 
calculations potentially lead to a variety of costs, both financial and other, for tax payers and 
governments alike. More common are increased costs in time, staff, and, in some cases, legal 
fees. Some governments are even bound by acceptability thresholds to promote fairness, 
equitability and overall government accountability with respect to valuation. 
Design/methodology/approach: There exist a number of vertical inequity measurements that 
have undergone academic testing and scrutiny within the property tax industry since the 
1970’s. Whilst these approaches have proved successful in detecting horizontal and vertical 
inequity, one recurring disadvantage pertains to measurement error / omitted variable bias, 
stemming largely from a failure to accurately account for location. A natural progression 
within property tax research is the application of a more spatially local weighted modelling 
approach to examine vertical and horizontal inequity. This research therefore specifies a 
GWR methodology to detect and measure vertical inequity in property valuations. 
Findings: The findings show the efficacy of using more applied spatial approaches for 
vertical tax estimation and indeed the limitations of employing conditional mean estimates 
coupled with delineated boundaries for assessing property tax inequity. The GWR model 
findings highlight the more fluctuating nature of vertical inequity across the Belfast market 
for the apartment sector both in a progressive and regressive sense and at different 
magnitudes. Moreover, the results reveal spatial clustering in the effects and are indicative of 
systematic inequities related to location inferring that spatial (horizontal) tax inequities are 
not random. The findings further show increased GWR model predictability overall.  
Originality/Value: This research adds to the existing literature base for evaluating both 
vertical and horizontal inequity in value-based property taxation at the intra-neighbourhood 
level. This is accomplished by modifying the Birch Sunderman approach through 
transforming the traditional OLS model architecture to a GWR model, thereby allowing 
coefficient estimates of inequity to not only vary across a jurisdiction, but at a more local 
level, in addition to incorporating property characteristic variables. This arguably allows 
assessors to identify specific geographical areas of concern, saving them money, time, and 
resources on identifying, addressing and correcting for inequity. 
Keywords: Property taxation, Vertical inequity, GWR, Regressivity, Progressivity.
Introduction
Property tax has long been a core revenue source and one of the largest forms of tax revenue 
for local governments to fund their mandated expenditures on local service provision 
(Sokolow, 2000; Bruce, 2000; Smith, 2008). Ad valorem property taxes have a presumptive 
tax base, underpinned by estimates of property value which must be viewed as both fair and 
equitable to have broad legitimacy and acceptance. Procedures related to the calculation of, 
or testing for property tax equity, are therefore not only of interest to local tax assessors and 
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tax lawyers but homeowners, real estate professionals and taxpayers (Birch and Sunderman, 
2013). The debate around property tax has often focused on why fair and equitable property 
tax is needed or the reasons for (under)collection rates for generating municipal revenues, 
primarily within decentralized administrations. An efficient property tax not only results in 
tax regimes which are effective in generating revenue whilst lowering administrative costs, 
but also increases government transparency and accountability. Specialists in public finance 
see advantages to a property tax because it provides fiscal and political autonomy for local 
governments (Slemrod, 1995). In terms of this autonomy, in theory, property tax provides the 
potential for increased economic efficiency, as it establishes a ‘tax price’ that taxpayers can 
react to and challenge accordingly, which is direct and visible and creates political 
accountability (Oates, 1996). 
Despite this, the efficiency of property as a tax mechanism is continuously scrutinized. As 
Johns and Wutthicharoen (2002) contend, if administrated correctly it can provide incentives 
for efficient land use and promote public policy, however, if not administered properly, any 
tax advantage can be lost, and it can distort land use and create excess burdens, especially for 
mobile capital. A core challenge for  the efficiency and administration of property tax centre 
on the consistency and accuracy of the measurement of an annual taxable value – primarily as 
a result of limited market transaction evidence which hampers accuracy and consistency in 
the valuations which form the tax base, raising concerns regarding questions regarding 
uniformity and equity.
Whilst there has been a relatively rich history examining and estimating property tax, it is 
generally considered problematic in terms of regressivity, administratively flawed and 
influenced by externalities - culminating in vertical and horizontal inequities (Fisher, 1996). 
Consequently, academic debate has focused on issues such as the level of the property tax, 
administration and assessment procedures, the regressive or progressive nature of the tax and 
the equity of the tax both vertically and horizontally (Benson and Schwartz, 1997). Indeed, 
questions of uniformity and equity in the property tax arena remain pervasive (Smith, 2008). 
Dynamic housing markets and geographic unevenness of price inflation continues to present 
assessment challenges. 
The general benchmark basis for tax assessment equity pertains to the assessment to sales 
ratio which associates (open) market value and predicted value. Vertical inequity manifests 
when properties with different market values pay a different proportionate share of property 
taxes relative to their market values, thus the ratio of assessed value to market value is not 
constant across different value ranges. The culmination is an unequal tax burden between 
higher-value and lower-value properties in the same property group, which manifests in 
either progressive or regressive taxation. Moreover, horizontal equity - a public finance 
concept of equal treatment of equals (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980) denotes that properties with 
similar market value are treated uniformly and appraised at the same percentage of market 
value (IAAO 1978), or that ratios are approximately similar, regardless of stratum (e.g. 
property types, age, architectural styles, locations). As Sirmans et al. (1996) point out, 
horizontal inequity occurs when ‘like’ properties having the same market values are assessed 
differently because of the following explanations, (a) from unequal knowledge of market 
participants, unequal negotiating skills of buyers and sellers, and actions by officials to limit 
property tax increases; (b) older homes being underassessed relative to newer homes, homes 
with views being over-assessed, and houses with larger lots being under-assessed; (c) 
positively related to the complexity of the jurisdiction's taxing structure; (d) Tax initiatives to 
limit property value; (e) models measuring vertical inequity generally examine the 
relationship between assessed value and market value.
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There has been much research which has tested for the presence of inequities in the 
assessment process (Sirmans et al., 1996). Early studies relied almost exclusively on the ratio 
of assessed value to sales price within an entire tax administrative area in order to explain the 
variation in property tax burdens. This issue is discussed by Birch and Sunderman (2013), 
who highlight that the problems associated with more primitive ‘pure’ district models is the 
lack of, or neglect of accounting for neighbourhood variation or locational effects - despite 
the importance of location as a dynamic in the appraisal of residential property. This aspect 
has generated considerable debate in the extant literature regarding the relative equity of 
residential property tax levels, and whether that equity is value or location based (Birch and 
Sunderman, 2013). Numerous studies (Smith, 2000; Smith, Birch, Sunderman, 2003; Smith, 
2008; Cornia and Slade, 2005; Birch and Sunderman, 2013) have introduced neighbourhood 
characteristics to negate the measurement error / omitted variable bias problem, extending the 
regression methodology to encompass sets of dummy variables for neighbourhoods to better 
estimate vertical and horizontal inequity. Whilst these studies advance from the traditional 
methods and increase the robustness of intra-jurisdictional inequity identification, they still 
employ conditional mean estimates for each neighbourhood control variable used in the 
analysis. From a spatial econometrics perspective, the application of delineated sub-markets 
(neighbourhoods) merely provides conditional mean estimates for each (sub) market 
geography, prohibiting the varying nature of price determination whilst not complying with 
the assumption of constant error variance (McMillen 2010).
To address these methodological limitations, this study examines a data set of apartment 
transactions in the Belfast housing market. The analysis employs an expanded version of a 
well-established instrumental variable model as developed by Clapp (1990) and subsequently 
augmented by Birch & Sunderman (2013), incorporating neighbourhood characteristics to 
identify whether intra-jurisdictional variation relating to the ratio of property tax to market 
value exists, as well as further reduce omitted variable bias with the inclusion of property 
characteristic variables. The approach adopted is a methodological development for 
neighbourhood tax inequity assessment to account for non-random spatial inequality - beyond 
using segmented or delineated administrative boundaries. This provides important insights 
into the distribution of tax burden across the Belfast market area and offers the prospect of an 
enhanced approach for identifying tax assessment inequity more generally, fostering more 
robust and reliable own source revenues for fiscally challenged jurisdictions.
Literature
Vertical Inequity
There has been a rich history of academic models developed to test for the presence of 
inequities in the assessment process (Sirmans et al., 1996). The literature pertaining to 
capitalisation of residential property taxes and tax inequity measurement is relatively long. 
Indeed, seminal applications date back to the 1960s and 1970s where notable research at this 
time was undertaken by Daicoff (1967), Netzer (1966) and Oates (1969). In an urban housing 
capacity Gustely (1976) scrutinised local taxes and expenditure in relation to aggregation bias 
for taxing owner occupied and rental dwellings and their capitalisation effects. Moreover, 
Wales and Wiens (1974) examined the assumption that taxes are capitalised into property 
value, determining that an apparent capitalisation effect is substantial and significant. Indeed, 
this emphasis of the economics of property tax and capitalisation laid the foundations for 
examining the role of inequity. 
The measures used to determine vertical equity began with straightforward comparisons of 
the assessed value and sales price (AV/SP) ratios between properties controlling for type and 
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value (Oldman and Arron, 1965). One of the original studies to investigate property tax 
inequity was undertaken by Paglin and Fogarty (1972), which at the time was a nuance in 
methodological terms regarding the incorporation of vertical and horizontal inequity. Their 
study examined the systematic and random bias within assessments to provide two measures 
of what they termed intrinsic regressivity and administrative regressivity across value ranges 
using value as a linear function of the observed sale price. In a similar vein, Cheng (1974) 
further assumes that the relationship between assessed value and sale price is nonlinear 
measuring the percentage changes in sale price and assessed value is required to evaluate if 
inequity is present. Further insights presented by the IAAO (1978) posited that the 
appropriate measure of vertical equity is the AV/SP ratio regressed on sales price. The basis 
for this approach is that the functional form allows for an intuitive explanation, namely that 
vertical equity exists if there is no correlation between the AV/SP ratio and sales price. The 
research conducted by Kochin and Parks (1982) challenged these existing approaches 
suggesting that these former models are biased toward regressivity due to an ‘‘errors in 
variables’’ problem as a result of sales price being used as a proxy for market value. 
Therefore, they proposed that logging and reversing the dependent and independent variables 
corrects the problem. This reverse causation, they emphasise, indicates that market value can 
be predicted from assessed value which they deem is inherently more accurate than sale 
price. Nonetheless, Bell (1984) argues that the Kochin and Parks model is flawed because it 
assumes market error but does not allow for subjective assessment error. Akin to Cheng 
(1974), Bell defends the traditional approach, but shows that nonlinear inequity is better 
captured by including a further quadratic term.
As discerned in the work of Kochin and Parks (1982) and Bell (1984), the primary concern 
with earlier approaches designed to estimate vertical inequity across single aggregations of 
data is the possible estimation bias primarily relating to measurement error. Ideed, a review 
of these methods by Sirmans, Diskin, and Friday (1995) found that most produce biased 
estimates as a result of measurement errors in independent variables, which produces an error 
in variables measurement, culminating in the standard error in variables problems and biased 
coefficients. Indeed, Sirmans, Diskin and Friday (1995), suggest that using sale price as a 
proxy for market value biases the results toward regressivity, whereas using assessed value to 
proxy market value results in a bias towards progressivity. 
The ‘measurement in errors issue’ has been mainly accounted for by the introduction of the 
instrumental variable model as originally developed by Clapp (1990). Indeed, Clapp (1990) 
argues that the Bell (1984) model will be biased toward regressivity and the Kochin and 
Parks (1982) model will be biased toward progressivity, stating that Kochin and Parks (1982) 
“gives a biased estimate for vertical inequity due to measurement error in the independent 
variable, LnA, as LnA values are only estimates of true market values”. Clapp (1990) 
therefore recognised that market value and assessed value are interdependent because taxes 
are capitalized negatively into market value. To solve the measurement issue, Clapp proposed 
a two-stage simultaneous equations model to measure vertical inequity based on the notion 
that the market value of an individual property is essentially unobservable. Specifically, he 
introduced an instrumental variable that accounts for the high correlation between market 
value and assessed value but is uncorrelated with the error terms in the Kochin and Parks 
model. 
In a similar vein, and concomitantly, Sunderman et al. (1990) were also evaluating 
measurement challenges. Pertinently, the authors reveal that under particular circumstances 
the relationship between assessed value and sales price may be S-shaped, and therefore 
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warrants dissection of the relationship in order to improve explanation. They developed a 
spline model breaking the regression framework into three distinct sections effectively 
calculating a regression line for low value properties, middle range properties and high value 
properties, or ‘knots’. They, similar to Clapp, envisaged this to more appropriately capture 
any nonlinearity in the relationship between sale price and assessed value. As a result, they 
propose two new models to better detect and explain vertical inequity: cubic spline and 
piecewise spine regression. When comparing their results with the traditional vertical 
inequity models they find inconsistencies. In the traditional models only the Bell (1984) 
model detected vertical inequity whilst the Paglin and Fogarty (1972), the IAAO (1978), the 
Köchin and Parks (1982), and the Cheng (1974) models showed no vertical inequity. As Bell 
used quadratic functions, this is perhaps more tied to measuring the ‘terms’ of the shape of 
the data similar to cubic and spline methodologies. The authors detected vertical inequity in 
both their cubic and piecewise spline models.
Other studies have also tested the nature of various modelling approaches for considering 
vertical inequity. Sirmans, Diskin and Friday (1995) using Miami-Dade County sales data, 
provide a comparison of all the available vertical inequity models including the Clapp (1990) 
model and the spline regression to examine vertical equity in single-family residences. Their 
results are inconclusive regarding the most superlative model. Sirmans et al. do, however, 
suggest that the Clapp (1990) model provides the most effective alternative to the problems 
encountered with many of the previous models. In a similar model testing study, Benson and 
Schwartz (1997) examine vertical inequity in home sales in Bellingham, Washington and 
provide a comparison of the traditional models with the piecewise spline regression model, 
however reject the models that assume sales price is a function of assessed value by arguing 
that it is difficult to defend the notion that government officials are better at developing 
estimates of value than the market. Their results reveal the spline regression model to be 
consistent with the traditional models (Paglin and Fogarty, 1972; Cheng, 1974; Bell, 1984; 
and IAAO, 1978), which all models displayed regressive vertical inequity. In a later study, 
Smith (2000) examines home sales in Bloomington, Indiana and provides a comparison of the 
traditional models with the Clapp (1990) and spline models. The results showed consistency 
across the traditional models (Paglin and Fogarty, 1972; Cheng, 1974; Bell, 1984; and IAAO, 
1978) and the Clapp model which revealed the presence of progressive vertical inequity, 
whereas the spline model presented more inconclusive findings.
Horizontal inequity
Early studies relied almost exclusively on the ratio of assessed value to sales price within an 
entire tax administrative area in order to explain the variation in property tax burdens. This 
issue is discussed by Birch and Sunderman (2013), who highlight that the problems 
associated with earlier pure district models is the lack of, or neglect of accounting for 
neighborhood variation, or locational effects, despite the importance of location as a dynamic 
in the appraisal of residential property. This, Birch and Sunderman (2013) indicate has 
generated numerous debate in the extant literature regarding the relative equity of residential 
property tax levels, and whether that equity is value or location based (Birch and Sunderman, 
2013). Pertinently, this argument pertains to the systematic differences in property 
assessments relative to market values within or between individual neighbourhood spatial 
units which suggest the presence of tax inequity within and between neighborhoods in 
administrative districts. 
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Pertinently, both Smith (2008) and Cornia and Slade (2005) highlight that inequity at the 
local level exists due to the presence of continuous systematic changes are occurring in the 
pattern of market prices within and between neighbourhoods; and the temporal lags due to the 
assessment adjustment process which culminate in dissimilarly in property value movements 
between spatial units with no corresponding property reassessments, thus creating vertical 
inequity within that unit. In light of this, the scholarly literature has analysed neighbourhood 
horizontal inequity by incorporating dummy neighbourhood variables for vertical and 
horizontal inequity in property tax inequity models. 
An early study by Plotnick (1981) examined horizontal inequity and found a small amount of 
inequity using Michigan Panel Data. Borland (1990) illustrates the difficulty that assessors 
face by showing that the degree of inequity is positively related to the degree of complexity 
for the assessing jurisdiction which he measures by the number of property tax rates and the 
rate of change in tax rates. An early study conducted by Birch, Sunderman, and Hamilton 
(1992) attempted to provide some insights for undertaking more micro-based approaches to 
reduce inequity in a typical jurisdiction. Their results highlighted the inherent difficulty for 
appraisers in extracting horizontal from vertical inequity. Similarly, Goolsby (1997) 
examined whether there is systematic error in property assessments for owner-occupied 
housing in Puget Sound, Washington. The investigative analysis revealed negative 
coefficients for sales price indicating that higher-valued houses have lower assessment ratios 
in all three counties examined – confirming more local or neighbourhood inequity. Similarly, 
they found that older houses tend to be underassessed with both the land value ratio and 
variables for home size comprising positive coefficients in all counties, indicating that larger 
houses and houses with a larger percentage of value represented by the value of the lot are 
systematically over-assessed. Importantly, this study infers that assessor bias is present in all 
three counties in Washington State. 
In a more recent study, Allen and Dare (2002) examine the complexity of horizontal inequity 
finding that the heterogeneity of both property and neighbourhood characteristics may affect 
the degree of difficulty in assessing properties – namely the variation of the assessed value 
around the sale price. In addition to this, Allen (2003) examines alternative methods for 
measuring vertical inequity in multifamily property markets using small-scale, multi-family 
properties. The results indicated that lower-value properties were assessed at a higher 
proportion of market value than higher-value properties. Smith, Sunderman, and Birch (2003) 
have attempted to more closely explain the causes of vertical inequity by examining the 
relationships between characteristics of a tax jurisdiction and the degree of vertical inequity 
in its assessments. In doing so, they manufactured an index of vertical inequity by county that 
is then predicted as a function of economic, geographic, and demographic characteristics. 
Their results established that a greater degree of progressive inequity is present in growing 
urban tax jurisdictions with high concentrations of commercial and/or industrial properties. 
The level of progressive inequity is also increased with the complexity in the tax jurisdiction. 
Following up on their 2003 study, Birch, Sunderman, and Smith (2004) test for vertical 
inequity using sales data for Bloomington, Indiana. Their major purpose is to compare a new 
model to the traditional measures of inequity. The authors use a method called Vertical 
Horizontal Appraisal Adjustment System (VHAAS) which they consider more robust A/S 
ratios and nonparametric methods, compared to measures and procedures in standard OLS. 
They find regressive inequity; however, emphasize that using this adjustment model the level 
of regressive inequity reduces.
An interesting paper in the confines of this paper is the study conducted by Cornia and Slade 
(2005) who analyse the uniformity of appraisal outcomes for multifamily apartment 
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complexes in Phoenix, Arizona. Examining both vertical and horizontal equity over a five-
year period, (1998-2002) they find no evidence of vertical inequity, however show modest 
evidence of horizontal inequity which they attribute to both complex size and geographic 
location which increases uniformity assessment. Importantly, they determine the presence of 
inequity between small and large properties, indicating that an income approach is superior to 
the sales comparison approach for valuing multifamily properties for tax purposes. A further 
study undertaken by Smith (2008) examined the intra-jurisdictional segmentation of property 
tax burdens on residents of Chicago, Illinois. Using a two-stage model with an instrumental 
variable as determined by Clapp (1990) to identify tax burden variations between 
neighbourhoods, Smith further specifies a second model which incorporates neighbourhood 
and property characteristics in an examination of variations in the ratio of property tax to 
market value, signalling aspects of market segmentation. Finally, Fairbanks et al. (2013) 
apply vertical inequity models to real estate data from Lubbock, Texas. Utilising a Monte 
Carlo simulation framework to more theoretically explore the performance of each inequity 
model, the authors generate eight different contrived inequity patterns from three different 
data-generating processes – manifesting in 24 stylized datasets. They therefore undertake the 
data-generating process which observes assessed value as a noisy function of sale prices, 
which reflect home values - considers the sale price as a noisy function of assessed values – 
and considers both sale prices and assessed values to be a noisy measure of home values. 
Pertinently, the findings provide no clear or manifest ‘best’ model – nonetheless provide a 
methodological basis for testing vertical tax inequity in future real estate data. 
The literature reveals that there remains some ambiguity as to the best approach for 
measuring vertical (and horizontal) inequity. Notably the literature does illustrate the 
interlinkages and suggests that the Clapp approach provides strong theoretical foundations for 
measurement which has been adopted into more nuanced analysis. Indeed, it highlights that 
the actual amount of omitted variable bias in previous models estimating district vertical 
inequity may be substantial when neighbourhood vertical and horizontal tax inequity is not 
accounted for. Given these concerns, earlier methodologies merely examining vertical 
inequity have been extended to include sets of dummy variables for neighbourhood vertical 
and horizontal inequity with the Birch-Sunderman arguably the best enhancement to date. 
The results from this study extend the academic literature on vertical inequity in property 
taxation by analysing jurisdictional variations in the property tax burden. 
Data and methods
Data
The data is obtained from the University of Ulster House Price Index (UU HPI) over the sixth 
month period Q3 2015 to Q4 2015 inclusive, representing a cross-section of the Belfast 
Metropolitan Area (BMA)1. The data sample uses 511 achieved sales for apartments within 
the analysis which were initially investigated for duplicate entries, missing observations and 
erroneous data entry. As this paper is exploratory in nature, we only use sales for the 
apartment sector. An address matching exercise was performed to align the addresses for 
each sale transaction with their X,Y coordinates using Geographical Information Software 
(GIS), The data was subsequently exported into the statistical package R to permit geo-
statistical analysis. The simulated assessed value was achieved using sale price which was 
adjusted to its natural logarithm, the area (m2) of the apartment dwelling and location as 
depicted by absolute location coordinates. 
1 The BMA is the largest urban area in Northern Ireland spanning 960km2 comprising six delineated geographic District 
Council Areas.  
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Methods
Natural progression within the literature and research in measuring tax inequality is to apply 
more spatially weighted local modelling frameworks to assess the varying nature of tax 
inequity across the administrative housing market structure. To examine and compare the 
degree of inequity in the tax assessment this research compares our model procedure against 
the base Clapp (1990) model and more revised Birch-Sunderman approach (2013) which 
accounts for neighbourhood location, in an augmented Clapp approach to uncover variations 
in the actual property tax burden. 
The Clapp Model (1990)
The first step in the procedure is to confirm the presence of vertical property tax inequity at 
the jurisdictional level, and if present, determine the direction of the inequity (progressive or 
regressive), thus the regression methodology employed by Clapp (1990) to estimate district 
vertical inequity is the basis of our model. As discussed in the literature, the widely-accepted 
Clapp (1990) model responds to a central concern with tests of property tax inequity; with 
variable, assessed value or sales price, should serve as the predictor variable. The Clapp 
model takes the form:
 𝐿𝑛𝐴 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑍
The LnA variable is as defined above, and a0 and a1 are the intercept and slope parameters.8 
The instrumental variable, Z, is assigned the values 1, 0, and 1, respectively, for the top, 
middle, and bottom one-third of all the sales properties in the analysis. When equation (1) is 
applied, the result is a set of fitted LnA values (called LnA*). There are three of these LnA* 
generated values, one of which is assigned to each property in the district. Thus, high, 
medium, and low property values generally receive high, medium, and low LnA* values.
The second stage of the Clapp model takes the form: 
 𝐿𝑛𝑆 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑑𝐿𝑛𝐴
where the resulting slope value obtained for  gives an estimate for district vertical inequity 𝑏𝑑
that has been adjusted for measurement error bias. Thus, in a later comparison of vertical 
inequity estimates, relatively higher slope coefficients indicate less progressive (or more 
regressive) taxes. 
Birch-Sunderman Clapp Model extension (2013)
In this second step, the goal is to confirm that variations in the property tax inequities can be 
identified and segmented into geographic subsets of the jurisdiction. The Clapp model is 
augmented to incorporate a vector of dichotomous variables representing each observation’s 
location in one of the government delineated wards across the Belfast market.  In order to 
extend the study to include neighbourhoods (wards), both horizontal and vertical inequity 
estimates need to be developed for these spatial units. First we consider neighbourhood gross 
and net horizontal inequity which is measured by the overall differences in typical property 
assessment to sales price (A-S) ratios of individual neighbourhoods. The two-stage Clapp 
procedure is subsequently applied separately to each of the neighbourhoods to obtain their 
gross vertical inequity slope estimates. This involves the inclusion of a set of standard 
dummy variables to the right side of the Clapp vertical inequity equation. The resulting 
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regression equation generates a set of neighbourhood treatment coefficients net of the value 
effect caused by district vertical inequity specified as: 
𝐿𝑛𝑆 =  𝐶0 +  𝑁∑
𝑗 = 1𝑐0𝑗𝐷𝑗 + 𝑐𝑑𝐿𝑛𝐴 ∗  
The  (j 1,2,...N) represent the dummy variables for each of the N individual 𝐷𝑗
neighbourhoods where the dummy variables take values of 1 for sales in their neighbourhood 
and 0 elsewhere. The c0j coefficients measure the relative treatment of individual 
neighbourhoods after district value effects have been removed, and the extent of differences 
in these coefficients is a measure of the neighbourhood variation.  The  coefficient is 𝑐𝑑𝐿𝑛𝐴 ∗
an estimate for district vertical inequity, adjusted (by the presence of the dummy variables) 
for neighbourhood horizontal inequity effects. 
To account for the net effect, the model is firstly used, as before, to estimate  a set of adjusted 
LnA values (LnA**), where there is a separate set of three such values for each of the 
neighbourhoods the model is applied. Unlike the estimation of neighbourhood gross vertical 
inequity, to estimate net vertical inequity within each neighbourhood requires a new equation. 
That equation requires two sets of dummy variables to obtain estimates for neighbourhood 
vertical inequity and to allow for the effects of neighbourhood horizontal inequity. Since it is 
net vertical inequity within neighbourhoods that is desired, then the equation must also 
include a variable for district vertical inequity. The equation can be written as:
𝐿𝑛𝑆 =  𝑒0 +  𝑁∑
𝑗 = 1𝑐0𝑗𝐷𝑗 + 𝑁∑𝑗 = 1𝑒1𝐿𝑛𝐴 ∗∗𝑗 𝐷𝑗 + 𝑒𝑑𝐿𝑛𝐴 ∗
where the sets of neighbourhood dummy variables (  and ) are assigned values of 1 𝐷𝑗 𝐿𝑛𝐴 ∗∗𝑗 𝐷𝑗
and LnA**. For sales outside their neighbourhood, the two sets of variables are both assigned 
0’s. The vector,  represents the amount the individual neighbourhood intercepts differ from 𝑒0𝑗
the overall or main intercept term, . The slope vector, , represents the set of 𝑒0 𝑒1𝑗
neighbourhood net vertical inequity parameters. The parameter, , attached to LnA* 𝑒𝑑
measures district vertical inequity after individual neighbourhood horizontal and vertical 
inequity have been allowed for by the inclusion of the two sets of dummy variables. 
This process permits distinct measures of vertical and horizontal inequity coming from 
individual both the neighbourhood level and the vertical inequity based on purely district 
forces. 
GWR modification
Despite the modification and enhancement to the Clapp (1990) method, The Birch-
Sunderman (2013) model still relies on delineated boundaries and conditional mean  
estimates for the entire sub-location (neighbourhoods). Our modification and augmentation to 
the Birch-Sunderman approach is to introduce a local weighted regression (LWR) approach, 
namely, Geographically weighted regression which has become a mainstream spatial 
modelling approach within house price analysis examining spatio-temporal analyses of 
neighbourhood and locational determinants. Our approach here uses the hypothesis that 
instead of treating the log of the fitted estimate (LnA* ) as a constant across an entire district, 
or a series of neighbourhoods, this will allow LnA* coefficients to vary over space, allowing 
for intra-neighborhood vertical and horizontal inequity comparison. The GWR model is 
represented by the following equation with the addition of the LnA parameter:
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𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽0(𝑥𝑖,𝑦𝑖) +  ∑𝛽𝑘(𝑥𝑖,𝑦𝑖)𝑥𝑖𝑘 +  𝐿𝑛𝐴 ∗ + 𝜀𝑖
where: yi = ith sale; β0 = model intercept; βk = kth coefficient; xik = kth variable for the ith sale
εi = error term of the ith sale; (xi, yi) = x,y coordinates of the ith regression point
GWR therefore uses exact (X,Y) location and creates a regression for each observation based 
on nearest neighbours (bandwidths) thus allowing coefficients to vary continuously over the 
study area which can be visualised and interrogated for relationship heterogeneity. This 
measures the inherent relationships around each regression point i, where each set of 
regression coefficients is estimated by weighted least squares. Within this study, the 
weighting scheme Wi is calculated with a kernel function based on the proximities between 
regression point i and the N data points nearby using an n x n spatial weights matrix. This 
determines the weight applied to each observation, assigned relative to the subject based on 
geographic distance:
wij = exp[-dij/b2]
where:  wij = weight applied to the jth property at regression point i; dij = geographical 
distance in kilometres between regression point i and property j ; b = geographical 
bandwidth.
The bandwidth in GWR specifies the radius of the weighting function which is either fixed, 
based on absolute distance, or adaptive - fluctuating, based on a predetermined number of 
nearest neighbours, with the optimum bandwidth determined using the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) to retain prediction accuracy whilst ensuring model parsimony. This research 
uses a tri-cube adaptive kernel function and bandwidth based on 47 nearest neighbours 
employing a Great Circle distance metric. 
Findings
According to the Clapp (1990) model, the overall data suggests a regressive vertical inequity  
displaying an LnA coefficient value of 1.42, with a 77% level of explanation (Table 1). This 
infers that higher value properties are under appraised relative to low value properties, higher 
variance at the top-value estimates versus sales and increased residual error. As highlighted in 
the literature, although this relationship is suitable for evaluating the presence of inequities 
over the entire tax jurisdiction, it does not allow for the extraction of variation throughout and 
within the Belfast market area.
<<<Insert Table 1 Clapp model LnA estimate>>>
The modified Clapp-Birch-Sunderman (2013) approach, applying dummy variables for each 
of the individual neighbourhood areas (wards) to obtain their gross vertical inequity slope 
estimates, reveals an LnA estimate of 1.31 (Table 2). The findings continue to reveal 
regressive vertical inequity albeit illustrating that this has reduced from the more global 
district model with the model explanation also increasing to 79.32%. The results suggest that 
the neighbourhood factors provide compelling signals of a regressive property tax when 
comparing between areas. 
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<<<Insert Table 2 Modified Birch-Sunderman model coefficients>>>
Whilst reducing the omitted variable bias evident in the Clapp approach, the Birch-
Sunderman model does not exhibit the spatial variation of the vertical inequity, with 
neighbourhoods coefficients comprising only a conditional mean estimate which could be 
under representative of very regressive and very progressive values cancelling each other out. 
In light of this, the GWR modified approach allows vertical inequity measurements to vary 
within a neighborhood/assessment jurisdiction(s) providing an intra-neighbourhood tax 
assessment. As observed in Table 3, the GWR model shows a much more mixed and 
dynamic picture. The median LnA coefficient reveals a value of 1.28 reducing the regressive 
nature of the tax inequity. When examining the vertical inequity estimates across the quartiles 
and minimum and maximum statistics, the LnA estimate clearly exhibits both progressivity 
and regressivity. At the first quartile, the inequity remains slightly regressive (1.054), 
however falls to 0.833 (minimum statistic) signalling assessments which are progressive 
thereby indicating that when higher priced properties pay a higher proportionate amount of 
taxes relative to their property's market value than lower priced properties. 
<<<Insert Table 3 GWR model coefficient>>>
In addition, the findings also spatial aggregation (clustering) and spatial concentration across 
the Belfast market in terms of tax inequity. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the market area 
towards the east of the city, and a small corridor spreading from the south towards the east 
exhibits a more progressive inequity, whereby higher value properties are being over 
appraised relative to lower value properties. Moving across the market, there appears to be 
more regressivity evident towards the north, city centre area and the band radiating towards 
the south. Interestingly, the results suggest the market can be characterised into three distinct 
segmented markets. Importantly, the findings also imply that the dynamism clearly illustrates 
that to simply infer that the Belfast market has regressivity would be an oversimplification 
and lead to erroneous policy conclusions. 
<<<Insert Figure 1 LnA GWR coefficient values>>> 
As evidenced in Figure 2, the GWR approach further increases the explanatory power of 
assessment inequity, with the local regression/moving window of GWR further reducing the 
omitted variable bias and misspecification challenges. Moreover, scrutiny of the localized R2 
statistic provides a basis for assessing model performance and where it is deficient i.e. where 
further omitted variable bias and model misspecification may still be present, which can aid 
assessors allocate resources to these areas to increase estimation accuracy. The model 
predictability shows some high levels of accuracy particularly in the east of the Belfast 
market, the north of the city and the corridor moving towards the south-west and in the west 
of the city. There appears to be a more varied progressive and regressive depiction in the city 
centre region and in a pocket towards the south and south-east. This is a very interesting 
finding as market knowledge confirms the areas with higher predictive accuracy to be 
characterized by homogeneity in terms of property age, with more heterogeneity in terms of 
age profile in the areas with poorer performance estimation. The accuracy levels in the model 
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does however confirm that market tax inequity variation, both progressive and regressive, is 
evident and that this is not due to poor model performance. Moreover, it also suggests that 
across value ranges a ‘one size fits all’ tax inequity estimation  does not work – arguably due 
to the curved nature of the pricing strata. This is undoubtedly a consequence of the spatial 
element – there are areas where model estimation is working well (and others where 
performance is poorer), thus, can more accurately account for differences as opposed to using 
a spatial proxy and resulting in less mis-specification and thereby improving appraisal 
testing.
<<<Insert Figure 2 GWR Model performance R2 estimation>>>
The findings have demonstrated that horizontal inequity (location variables) allow us to 
extract horizontal inequity from the vertical inequity measurement (LnA). This naturally 
leads us to question whether there remains omitted variable bias for other characteristics, in 
addition to location, that can cause inequities. We should include physical characteristics to 
see where the inequities are. That is, horizontal inequity may be causing vertical inequity 
(e.g. higher-priced homes in one location are “under-assessed” – due to horizontal inequity 
from failure to capture their property attributes). It could be that properties with particular 
value enhancing attributes may be outdated/inaccurate, or are correlated with some other trait 
that are not being taken into consideration in valuations/assessments. Indeed, without omitted 
variables you could conclude you have vertical inequity, but you may really have both, and 
the horizontal inequity causes vertical in quity.
In light of the inherent issues, we further undertake exploratory analysis encompassing 
additional features of property characteristics to investigate the horizontal inequity aspect – in 
addition to location. Given this is confined to one subset of property type (apartments) we 
introduce the heating type coefficient, total complex size and whether there is parking 
available to establish the level of vertical (and horizontal) inequity (Table 4). The results 
from introducing the additional horizontal coefficients into the model estimation reveals 
increased levels of explanation for both the Birch-Sunderman and GWR approach. 
Pertinently, the findings reduce the LnA coefficient estimate for the Birch-Sunderman model 
to 1.29 thereby reducing the level of vertical inequity. Examination of the GWR model shows 
increased variation in the LnA estimate, revealing it to fluctuate between 0.79 to 2.26 
indicating high instances of regressivity and progressivity within tax inequity. This is an 
important finding as it clearly exhibits that horizontal inequity may be causing vertical 
inequity. Indeed, the findings suggest that without these omitted variables, errors in 
conclusions may be inferred – namely that vertical inequity is present, however, in reality  
there may be both and the horizontal inequity causes vertical inequity (because of the 
correlation previously explained). This appears manifest when examining the coefficient 
estimates for the included characteristics between the models. The conditional mean 
estimates for the Birch-Sunderman approach show how mis-estimation could occur and the 
subsequent over or under assessment in inequity would be resultant. 
<<<Insert Table 4 Birch-Sunderman and GWR estimates>>>
The GWR enhancement nonetheless permits the estimation of the Area, Electric Heat, 
Parking and Plot size coefficients (in this instance) to also fluctuate and providing a 
coefficient value at each assessed property thereby providing more granular analysis of the 
spatial variation as to the effects of each on value. For example, for price estimation and 
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subsequent tax inequity ratio assessment, the Electric Heat coefficient displays a value range 
from negative 0.0025 to positive 0.1875 illustrating that this comprises a differential pricing 
effect across the market and therefore can contribute to horizontal inequity and thus vertical 
inequity estimation error if not adequately allowed to spatially vary. Indeed, further  
examination of the property characteristics coefficients effects on contributing to tax inequity 
present some important insights (Table 5). The GWR inequity assessment shows the volume 
and estimated degree of the parameter estimates causing horizontal and vertical inequity. 
Indeed, the property size attribute shows circa 37% of properties to be significant contributors 
towards property tax inequity with the parking and plot size attributes also displaying an 
effect, albeit it to a lessor degree. The analysis exhibits that apartments with electric heat are 
not associated with inequity.
<<<Insert Table 5 Coefficients comprising inequity effects>>>
Indeed, as depicted in Figure 3, the Area coefficient shows the plotted observations (local 
regressions) that comprise a statistically significant values (t > 1.99) which are causing tax 
inequity. As evidenced, the nuance in this modified GWR approach is that this provides a 
detailed and granular representation for assessors who can establish how many of the 
property attributes are associated with inequity by location - and also where these 
characteristics are not associated with inequity. This is vitally important for policy as 
assessors can see isolate the characteristics and location to enhance their taxation assessment 
and therefore save time and money by only concentrating on the afflicted areas. It could be 
that the specific characteristic is causing an inequity or it could be correlated with something 
that is causing an inequity (e.g. is it really the size of the lot that's causing an issue, or are big 
lots correlated with other things that are contributing to inequities such as parking). These can 
be used as a tool for assessors to undertake diagnostics and figure out where inequity is 
coming from so they can isolate it and reverse it.  
<<<Insert Figure 3 Area coefficient based on statistically significant t-values
Overall, the analysis shows that the predictive capacity of the model estimation increases 
with the more spatially weighted GWR approach. As established, the modified GWR 
approach increases the predictive accuracy by circa 10 percentage points over the traditional 
base model devised by Clapp (1990) (Table 5). More importantly, given the architecture of 
the GWR method, and for advances in tax inequity understanding and appraisal, the isolation 
and analysis of the spatially varying nature of both location and property characteristics 
which cause both vertical and horizontal inequity is needed to more accurately depict tax 
inequity for a more proficient assessment. 
<<<Insert Table 6 Model overview for predictability and accuracy>>>.
Conclusions
Property tax assessment remains a core source of revenue for municipal government 
administration, providing an essential, and stable, balance to municipal and local fiscal 
structures.  Effective function of these taxes requires defence of the tax base, with reference 
to fairness and equity. The exploratory analysis used in this paper to test the methodology 
Page 13 of 22 Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial M
anagem
ent of Property and Construction
developed serves as the basis to compare and test effectiveness in estimation of inequity 
against extant approaches. Indeed, the modification within this paper clearly demonstrates 
that the application of more spatially orientated approaches helps isolate exactly which 
properties are causing valuation inequity so assessors can save time and money, and target 
geographic locales to increase explanation and reduce both the nature and extent of vertical 
and horizontal tax inequality. 
The main purpose of this paper is to expand district vertical inequity models through the 
specification of a geographically weighted regression approach. This extension to previously 
adjusted neighbourhood models arguably demonstrates the usefulness and significance of 
using such an approach to measure both vertical and horizontal inequity. Whilst previous 
models demonstrated the value of accounting for geographic changes and omitted variable 
bias when estimating district vertical inequity relative to pure district models, they too are 
also prone to misspecification error. In a ‘true’ spatial sense, these approaches only culminate 
in conditional mean estimates per neighborhood area contained within a district and therefore 
can cancel out both regressive and progressive tax inequity in an intra-neighbourhood 
assessment. Moreover, the application of locational dummy variables neglect to account for 
the varying nature of house prices, and spatial heterogeneity and therefore do not fully satisfy 
the assumption of constant error variance needed for robust model estimation.
In terms of the findings, the Clapp model showed there to be quite a regressive tax inequity 
for the apartment sector in the Belfast housing market area. The extended model employing 
the Birch-Sunderman augmentation of Clapp, improved the LnA estimate for the Belfast 
district’s vertical inequity illustrating that both horizontal and vertical inequity are present. 
Our spatial enhancement, and the importance of the findings clearly indicate that more 
accurately controlling for location improves the ‘location’ estimates - improving vertical 
inequity assessment by illustrating intra-neighbourhood submarkets where there are pockets 
of both progressivity and regressivity. Indeed, the significance of  the GWR approach is that 
through isolation of exact location any adjustment of neighborhood and district related 
assessment practices that underlie these tax inequities can be targeted and addressed, thereby 
further improving tax equity when used as a part of any general reassessment process. 
Indeed, the results suggest that there are significant differences in property tax burdens across 
the spectrum of property and neighborhood characteristics, indicating systematic inequities 
exist in the tax burden, and the inequities exhibit an observable spatial pattern with specific 
characteristics of the neighborhood linked to the level of inequity. The findings further 
support the hypothesis that the spatial inequities are not random, but instead are related to the 
characteristics of the neighborhood which the GWR model has defined based on tax inequity. 
As a consequence, an interesting finding which emerged is the apparent spatial clustering and 
segmentation of tax inequality in geographic locales across the Belfast market. Whilst not 
surprising given the nature and structure of housing markets, the analysis illustrates manifest 
differences in property tax burdens and tax capitalisation impacts on fairness and uniformity 
for both lower and higher (poorer, wealthier) housing.
The nuance in the methodological approach developed in this paper has a number of 
significant  practical implications for industry. In terms of policy and practice, the testing of 
horizontal inequity illustrated that there may be correlation effects based on the 
characteristics which can introduce measurement error for appraisers, preventing them from 
valuing uniformly. The adoption of the locally weighted approach helps isolate exactly which 
properties are causing valuation inequity so assessors can save time and money addressing 
them. Also, using GWR which allows coefficients to vary over space does not assume that 
these new variables are impacting equity to the same degree and magnitude. The 
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methodological enhancement offered is arguably the first study (of which we are aware) 
which clearly provides a more granular depiction of tax inequity using absolute geographical 
location. The advantages of incorporating this approach into tax assessment is clearly evident 
as it helps appraisers isolate attributes contributing to horizonal inequity and offers insights as 
to whether this horizontal inequity may be causing vertical inequity. In addition, it offers a 
relatively adoptable and feasible method to identify intra-neighborhood and cross-
neighborhood inequity that spans existing aggregation borders - arguably allowing for a more 
informed depiction of a spatially referenced vertical inequity tax allocation. The evidence is 
equally important to analysts concerned with market segmentation and the implications of 
property tax variations on real estate markets.
A limitation to the research is that this has only examined the apartment sector and the 
findings remain restricted to a relatively homogeneous property type. Nonetheless, whilst the 
findings are restricted to one housing sector, the results show there to be quite wide variation 
in the LnA estimates which suggests that approaches which employ geographically 
delineated government/administrative boundaries do not reflect adequately the truer scale of 
tax inequity across markets and administrative districts. Moving forward, further research 
should perhaps investigate and account more for the heterogeneity of the wider property 
stock. The introduction of more property attributes and market based features would increase 
understanding of the horizontal nature of the inequity assessment and further enhance model 
specification and performance. In saying that, from a mass appraisal sense, the findings 
support the application of this novel technique for jurisdiction wide inequity assessment.
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Table and figure Enhancing vertical inequity paper submission
Tables
Table 1 Clapp model LnA estimate 
B Std. Error t value
Intercept -4.9039 0.3977 -12.330***
LnA 1.4210 0.0343 41.411***
R2 0.7711
Adj. R2 0.7707
F-stat 1715.0***
N 511
***denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; **5% level;*10% level
Table 2 Modified Birch-Sunderman model coefficients
B Std. Error t value
Intercept -3.7276 0.4341 -8.586***
LnA 1.3145 0.0378 34.770***
Ward9 0.0847 0.0365 2.318*
Ward12 0.1003 0.0312 3.207**
Ward15 0.0307 0.0382 0.805
Ward29 0.0545 0.0258 2.115*
Ward33 0.0535 0.0360 1.487
Ward36 0.0269 0.0350 0.768
Ward37 0.0337 0.0433 0.778
Ward38 0.0566 0.0230 2.459*
Ward42 0.1991 0.0260 7.640***
Ward49 0.0688 0.0349 1.970*
R2 0.7976
Adj. R2 0.7932
F-stat 178.8***
N 511
***denotes statistical significance at the 0.1% level; **1% level;*5% level
Table 3 GWR model coefficient
Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
Intercept -15.1393 -5.2677 -3.3325 -0.6751 1.9390
LnA 0.8333 1.0536 1.2852 1.4510 2.3080
R2 0.8554
Adj. R2 0.8369
AICc -503.0763
N 511
    Kernel function: tricude. Adaptive bandwidth: 47 (nearest neighbours). Great Circle distance metric 
employed. 
Page 19 of 22 Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial M
anagem
ent of Property and Construction
Table 4 Birch-Sunderman and GWR estimates
Birch-Sunderman GWR
β t value Min 1st Q Median 3rd Q Max
Intercept -3.4913 -0.014779 -0.2210 -0.1043 -0.3704 2.835
LnA 1.2920 34.770*** 0.79044 0.9510 1.0562 1.1790 2.256
Ward9 0.08477 2.318**
Ward12 0.10037 3.207**
Ward15 0.03075 0.805
Ward29 0.05459 2.115**
Ward33 0.05335 1.487
Ward36 0.02693 0.768
Ward37 0.03374 0.778
Ward38 0.05669 2.459**
Ward42 0.19916 7.640***
Ward49 0.06882 1.970*
Area 0.003455 7.968*** 0.000891 0.00212 0.00280 0.004207 0.00820
Plot size 0.000262 0.170 0.02277 0.00074 0.00026 0.02062 0.0329
Parking 0.00416 1.553 -0.0413 -0.0107 -0.0051 0.00540 0.3831
Electric Heat -0.0040 1.981** -0.02543 -0.0079 -0.0032 0.0540 0.1875
R2 0.8311 0.8951
Adj. R2 0.8260 0.8692
F-stat 162.4***
AICa -689.118a
N 511 511
a.Fortheringham et al. (2002: 96, eq. 4)
Table 5 Coefficients comprising inequity effects>>>
Property Characteristic Significant Obs. % Obs.
Plot size 66 12.91
Electric heat 2 0.004
Area 190 37.18
Parking 37 7.24
Significant Obs. (t>1.99,p<.05)
Table 6 Model overview for predictability and accuracy
Model type Adj. R2 Accuracy
Clapp: 77 Base model
Modified Clapp (Birch Sunderman): 79 +2
Modified GWR: 84 +7
Modified Clapp (BS) with property characteristics: 83 +6
Modified GWR with property characteristics: . 87 +10
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Figures
Figure 1 LnA GWR coefficient values 
Figure 2 GWR Model performance R2 estimation
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Figure 3 Area coefficient based on statistically significant t-values
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